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Regulation of Consumer Instalment Credit
DONALD J. M. BROWNO
The relatively modem phenomena of instalment sales financing
has been the subject of much public controversy of late. In particular,
legislators, journalists and consumer associations have been advocating
the need for some regulation of consumer instalment credit. The
objective of this article is to examine some of the problems involved.
In the first place, the operation of consumer credit in its commercial
setting will be outlined; secondly, the current legal position will be
considered; and finally, some of the methods of regulation will be
examined with particular emphasis directed to Senator Croll's proposed
"Finance Charges (Disclosure) Bill."'
I THE COMMERCIAL SETTING
The magnitude of consumer credit outstanding is astounding.
Since World War II there has been an unprecedented increase in
ownership of personal assets such as automobiles, television sets,
appliances and power boats.2 There has been a corresponding increase
in the amount of outstanding consumer instalment credit. For ex-
ample, consumer instalment credit outstanding in the United States
jumped from 15 billion dollars in 1950 to 40 billion by 1960.3 In
Canada, outstanding consumer instalment credit has climbed from 57
million dollars in 1946 to 1,466 million in 1962.4
Basically, a consumer has two alternatives in financing his pur-
chase; cash, or some form of deferred payment. There are several
methods of deferring payment including secured or unsecured loans
from banks, finance companies and credit unions, or by some
*Mr. Brown is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School
IFinance Charges (Disclosure) Bill, Bill S-2, Senate of Canada Bills,
24th Parliament (1962). Re-introduced; Bill S-3, Senate of Canada Bills, 25th
Parliament (1962).
246 FederaZ Reserve Bulletin 675 (June 1960); Consumer Instalment
Credit, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Report, Part I, Vol. I, pp.
22-24 (1957).
3 Ibid.
4 RoyaZ Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects; Financing Econo-
mic Activity in Canada, Hood (1958), 135. Also see Submission To The
Royal Commission On Banking And Finance; Laurentide Financial Corpora-
tion Ltd. (1962) p. A1382.
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"revolving credit" 5 scheme, popular in department store sales financ-
ing. However, the deferred payment plan most frequently employed
in financing consumer durables is the instalment sale.
The distinguishing feature of a purchase by instalment is an
agreement for periodic payment of the purchase price while the buyer
enjoys use of the goods. The conditional sale contract is utilized as a
security device, and usually the seller further protects himself by
requiring a promissory note for the purchase price. As well, the
agreement often includes insurance against loss of the article and
sometimes a policy of insurance on the life of the buyer for the
amount of the purchase price outstanding.
6
The usual consumer sales financing scheme is a much more com-
plex arrangement. The automobile industry, where manufacturers do
not extend credit to their dealers, is an apt illustration. The majority
of automobile dealers finance their inventories and provide credit
facilities for purchasers by means of a "floor-plan" arranged with
one or more financing institutions. Under a "floor-plan" the financing
institution advances cash to the retailer to purchase inventory taking
back some security, usually a chattel mortgage, thus creating "whole-
sale" paper. In exchange for this financing, usually at a very low
rate, the dealer agrees to sell all of his retail instalment sales con-
tracts, which carry a much more favourable rate of interest, to the
financing institution. Generally, this relationship between the dealer
and finance company will involve the finance company furnishing
the blank contracts, promissory note forms, rate charts, and often
a telephone credit checking service. As well, the arrangement almost
invariably involves "dealer participation" by way of so-called "dealer
reserves". That is, the finance company requires the dealer to build
up a percentage of the instalment credit outstanding in reserve against
which the financier may make claim in the event of a customer's
default. Upon a certain level being reached these reserves are re-
turned to the dealer in the form of commissions and they often com-
prise a sizeable portion of his income. Under these arrangements it
is obvious that the only "customer" of the finance company is the
retail dealer. The consumer is of interest to the financier only when
his payment comes due.7
5 This rather recently developed credit device operates as follows: The
parties decide what minimum monthly payment the customer should be
expected to make and by multiplying the sum by the number of months
n the duration of the plan, thereby the customer's maximum allowable
credit is arrived at The customer then makes a monthly payment including
a "service charge" on the outstanding balance each month.
6 See generally Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instal-
ment Sales, 68 Yale L.J. 839; 845 (1959); Retail Instalment Sales Legislation,
58 Col. L.R. 854, 857 (1958); Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment
Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q. 38, pp. 40-41 (1958-59); Ivan R. Feltham
& Kristine Feltham, Retail Instalment Sales Financing-Rights of The
Assignee-Endorsee--Identification of The Finance Company with the Dealer
to Protect The Buyer, 40 Can. B. Rev. 461. (1962).
7 Ibid.
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Under these conditions competition among finance companies
is not at the consumer level at all. The financing institutions are
concerned almost solely with selling and establishing "floor-plans"
with dealers. This being so, competition between financiers reflects
itself less in a reduction of the finance charge to the consumer than
in more favourable "participation" terms for the dealer. The most
attractive plan to the dealer is the one with the highest rate of dealer
participation coupled with the lowest reserve requirements. When
insurance is part of the instalment sale contract, with the dealer
acting as agent, the plan with highest commissions rather than the
lowest rates will similarly be the most attractive. Experience has
shown that this condition of "reverse competition" tends to force
finance rates to the consumer upward rather than downward.
8
This would not be so if consumers "shopped" for credit. It
appears from the surveys made that the majority of consumers are
ignorant as to the cost of their financing purchases by deferred pay-
ment.9 As one commentator states:
"What is surprising is not that the interest rates for direct consumer
loans range from 12% to 37%, for those rates are fairly conventional;
rather, it is that very few borrowers have any comprehension of the
true interest rates; nor are the direct lending institutions required to
so inform the public. Instead one is faced with charts and tables and
other graphic evidence of what one must repay over the period of the
loan in so many installments of so much each in order to borrow a
certain sum. Aside from the very few who are aware of the rule of
thumb that monthly installments make the effective rate about twice
the discount, most consumers have completely inaccurate approximations
of the true interest rate on consumer loans."1 0
These remarks would seem to apply to consumers financing their
purchases by instalment sale despite the fact that most finance
companies clearly state the amounts of the purchase price, the periodic
instalment, and the total cost in dollars on the face of their contracts.
Undoubtedly this lack of discrimination by consumers, coupled with
the complexity of the calculations necessary to translate the dollar
amounts into the effective simple interest rate, complement "floor-
planning" arrangements in creating the paradox of "reverse competi-
tion".
From the preceding observations regarding instalment sales
financing a few points may be summarily noted. The vast increase in
consumer credit outstanding in the past two decades has been largely
implemented by instalment sales. A paradoxical situation termed
"reverse competition" exists which results in upward pressure on
interest rates to consumers. This seems to be due, in part, to the
nature of the usual "floor-plan" arrangement between dealers and
financiers whereby competition among financiers is only at the dealer
level; and in part, to the consumers' lack of care and understanding
s Supra, footnotes 2, 4 and 6.
9 Hood, supra, 182; Schuchman: Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts
11, 35 Temple L.Q. 281 (1962).
lo Ibid. Schuchman, 290.
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as to the cost of consumer credit. In these circumstances one is not
surprised to find many people claiming abuses exist and that some
form of regulation is needed for the protection of consumers.
II THE LEGAL POSITION
It is perhaps surprising that at present, in Ontario, there is no
regulation of instalment sales financing either requiring disclosure of
interest charges or limiting the rate of finance charges." Loans from
banks are governed by the Bank Act.12 All other loans under $1,500
must comply with the maximum rates set out in the Small Loans
Act.'3 Apart from these enactments, there is no other regulation of
the cost of credit to the consumer. Section 2 of the Interest At
14
states:
The question arises; does the Small Loans Act cover instalment
sales financing situations? In the first place it is necessary to analyze
the instalment sale as a financing technique from the legal point of
view. The instalment sale has been developed through the utilization
of several legal concepts. The Sale of Goods Act 15 governs the buyer-
seller relationship; the law of negotiable instruments deals with the
rights and obligations of the parties to the usual promissory note; the
law of assignment is brought into play; where insurance is involved,
the law of insurance applies; and finally, the law regulating the various
chattel security devices operates upon the rights of the dealer and his
successor in interest, the financing institution. Thus an instalment
sale in law involves a complex interaction of several legal concepts.
Does this arrangement fall within the thrust of the maximum
interest rate provisions of the Small Loans Act? The Small Loans
Act' 6 speaks in terms of "interest" which it leaves undefined. Thus, is
l It is possible that some remedy may be obtained under the Unfair
Competition provision, Section 7 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1953 c. 49.
The possibility is remote however, and the problems raised by this section
are beyond the scope of this article. It should also be noted that the
Unconscionable Transactions Belief Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 410 was recently
declared ultra vires the provincial legislature by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Re Sampson and Barfried Enterprises Ltd. (1962) 35 D.L.R. (2d)
449. This decision is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
As well, an identical enactment has been introduced in the House of Com-
mons; Bill C-67, House of Commons of Canada, 25th Parliament (1962).
However, an extensive comment would be unwarranted as it will not likely
be enacted in its present form.
12 S.C., 1953-54, c. 48.
13 R.S.C., 1952, c. 251, as amended S.C., 1956, c. 46.
14 R.S.C., 1952, c. 156.
"2. Except as otherwise provided by this or by any other Act of the
Parliament of Canada, any person may stipulate for, allow and exact, on
any contract or agreement whatsoever, any rate of interest or discount
that is agreed upon."
15R.S.O., 1960, c. 358.
16The maximum interest provisions form the pith and substance of
the Act. These are; 2% per month on the unpaid principal balance up to
the amount of $300.00; 1% per month on the unpaid balance exceeding
$300.00 but under $1,000.00 and 2% per month on any remainder up to
$1,500.00. A special long term provision provides that where loans of
[voL. 2:467
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a finance charge "interest"? In England, traditionally an article had
both a "time-price" and a "cash-price". The Courts devised this dis-
tinction and held the difference between the "time-price" and the
"cash-price" was not "interest" and hence, not subject to the old
usury laws. This question has not come before a Canadian Court and
cannot authoritatively be answered. It is submitted, however, that
any court desiring to find a finance charge "interest" would have
little difficulty in so doing. Both the "interest" on a loan and the
"finance charge" on an instalment sale represent the cost to the con-
sumer of using another's money.
A more perplexing question is whether the instalment sale
arrangement could be regarded as a loan? The root of the instalment
sale concept is a sale of goods, but when the promissory note is added
and the dealer-finance company relationship is superimposed, does
the transaction not take the colour of an indirect loan? Although
there is little jurisprudence on the issue of "sale" or "loan" where
a dealer sells his instalment sales contracts to a financing institution,
the question of whether a finance company was a "money-lender"
within the old Money Lenders Act,'7 in the same circumstances, was
considered by an Assistant Master of the Supreme Court of Ontario.' 8
It must be noted that in this decision the concept of the finance
company vis a vis the buyer under a "floor-plan" was not explored,
although it appears such a plan was employed. The case concerned a
dealer and a finance company. The Assistant Master found the finance
company not to be a money lender and shortly dismissed the question,
saying:
"In answer to the charge that the defendant is a money lender. .
"It is admitted that no one can walk into the defendant company's
office and obtain a loan. A witness from the government department
concerned stated on cross-examination that he doubted whether an
application from the company for registration would be accepted, and
that no corporation carrying on a similar business is registered. There
must be some sound reason for what appears to be an established
policy. It is contrary to that policy to fetter ordinary commercial trans-
actions with prohibitions designed to protect the public at large. The
defendant restricts its activities to a certain type of transaction and
to a certain class of persons, namely businessmen or organizations
seeking to finance their undertakings in volume, organizations pre-
sumably operated by trained and experienced businessmen."
20
Clearly this reasoning should not be applicable to the situation that
exists between the consumer and finance company under a "floor-
plan" as outlined above.
$500.00 or less are repayable over a period greater than 20 months or a loan
exceeding $500.00 is repayable over a period exceeding 30 months, the cost
of the loan must not exceed 1% per month on the unpaid balance. "Cost of
the Loan" is defined in Section 2(a) in very broad terms which include,
inter aria, discounts, commissions, fees and other charges whether called
interest or not. There have been no reported decisions interpreting the
Small Loans Act.
17 R.S.C., 1952, c. 181. Repealed S.C., 1956, c. 46, s. 8.
18 Igloo Refrigeration Co. Ltd. vt. I.A.. Limited, [19431 O.W.N., 604, per
Master Lennox.
19 Ibid., p. 608.
201bid., p. 609.
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The English judges dealing with the same issue have been more
forthright. 1 For example, Mr. Justice Porter, in a case twenty-five
years ago, specifically, took the position that the form of the trans-
action overrode its substance. He stated:
"On the other hand, the defendants say that in fact there was no such
sale at all, that this so-called sale was merely a sham, and that this
transaction was merely a method of borrowing money by Messrs. Brights
from the plaintiffs and that therefore the plaintiffs were money-lenders,
and, not being registered as such, they cannot recover the money. There
is something to be said for that argument, but what one has to
remember-and I think this might be said of almost all bodies which
finance hire-purchase agreements (and they are very numerous at the
present time)-is that their real function is the lending of money and
it must necessarily be so. Although that may be the object and intention
for which they exist, the question is not with what object they employ
their money, but the method they have of employing it. If the method
employed constitutes a sale, then the transaction is not only the lending
of the money but also a purchase of the goods, even although it is only
for the purpose of lending money that it is being done in that way."
22
Technically, it would seem that a typical instalment sale transaction
is a purchase and sale. However, this issue has not come before the
courts of Ontario, and the desirability and possibility of the Small
Loans Act applying to instalment sales has yet to be considered.
IIM REGULATION BY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
If faced with the question of the applicability of the Small Loans
Act to instalment sales an Ontario court could follow the technical
line of the English decisions. On the other hand, some American
judges have said that in certain circumstances instalment sales are
substantially loans, and as such subject to the usury legislation.
Couched in terms of "time-price" and "cash-price", American jur-
isprudence has evolved three such exceptions to the traditional con-
cept of instalment sales.23
The major exception, based on an agency concept, is most clearly
expounded in Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corpn..2 4 a decision
of the Arkansas Court of Appeal. Here, the contract blanks and rate
schedules were supplied to the dealer by the finance company, and
the promissory note and contract were assigned to the company by
the dealer immediately following the sale to the purchaser. Because
of this "close relationship" the Court held the transaction not a sale
but a loan from the finance company to the buyer through the agency
of the dealer and thus subject to the usury law. In a caveat following
the decision the Court postulated three guides summarily stated as
follows:
21 In Re George Inglefield Limited, [1933] Ch. 1; Olds Discount Corp.
Ltd. v. John Playfair, [1938] 3 All E.R. 275; Olds Discount Corp. Ltd. v.
Cohen, [1938] 3 All E.R. 281; Transport Corporation Ltd. 'v. Morgan, [1939]
2 All E.R. 17; Chow Yoong Hong v. Choong Fah, [1961] 3 All E.R. 1163.
22 Olds Discount Corp. Ltd. v. Cohen [1938] 3 All E.R. 281.
23 See generally supra footnote 6.
24249 S.W. 2d 973 (1952).
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"A. It reaffnmed that a seller may charge a genuine time-sale price,
but declared that the "good-faith" of the seller would be a question
of fact.
B. If the seller, whether or not he has quoted the buyer a cash price
and a credit price, subsequently transfers the contract to a finance
company having had a reasonable assurance at the time of the sale
that the finance company would discount the contract and the discount
rate is greater than the legal interest rate, then the transaction will be
considered a loan and the buyer may have the protection of the usury
statutes.
C. Assurance that the finance company would discount the sales con-
tract may be implied when the finance company has furnished the dealer
with forms and rate information."25
The second situation in which the usury laws have been held applicable
to instalment sales is where the finance company directly negotiates
the terms, or where the nature of the relationship is such that the
finance company imposes the terms of the conditional sale on both the
buyer and the seller.26 The third situation in which the American
Courts have found the instalment sale to be a loan is where the
"time-price" has been computed by adding finance charges to the
"cash-price".Y
The choice is open. There are clear routes to each conclusion.
On the one hand, a technical analysis, such as that found in the
English decisions, referred to earlier, would lead to the conclusion that
the transaction is a sale of goods. On the other hand, some American
decisions hold that substance rather than form is paramount. They
state that as a commercial reality there is little or no difference
between the buyer borrowing the purchase price and giving back a
chattel mortgage as security and a purchase by instalment wherein
the buyer executes a conditional sale contract as security. They
recognize that in both cases the seller does not finance the sale nor
does the buyer have sufficient money to make immediate payment.
They realize in both cases the advance is made by a financial in-
stitution and for this service the buyer pays a sum of money over
and above the cash price of the article. The American Courts say, in
effect, that any distinction between a loan and financing a purchase
by instalment sale is transparent in the present day situation where
credit sales are essentially tripartite transactions involving buyer,
seller and finance company, with the buyer bearing the cost of the
credit as he would under a secured loan arrangement
The difficulties involved in choosing between these two avenues
of reasoning are by no means novel. Throughout the history of
commercial law the courts have struggled with two countervailing
policies. They have been faced with the difficulty of keeping abreast
of commercial practice while at the same time preserving certainty
in the law. Cockburn, C.J., in the famous case of Goodwin v. Ro-
25 Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments In the Law 55 North-
western L.R. 301 at 305, (1960-61).
26 Ibid., at 308; Nazarin v. Lincoln Finance Co., 78 A. 2d 7 (1951); Jackson
v. C.C.C., 83 S.E. 2d 76. (1954).
27 Daniel v. First Natl. Bank 227 F. 2d 353; Thompson v. 0. C. Equipment
Corp., 99 N.W. 2d 761 (1959).
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barts,28 coped with these considerations when he found debenture
scripts to be negotiable. He states on one hand, the need for growth
and flexibility:
"The universality of a usage voluntarily adopted between buyers and
sellers is conclusive proof of its being in accordance with public con-
venience; and there can be no doubt that by holding this species of
security to be incapable of being transferred by delivery, and as
requiring some more cumbrous method of assignment, we should
materially hamper the transactions of the money market with respect
to it and cause great public inconvenience."29
On the other hand he cautions:
In a recent case in the Ontario Court of Appeal Mr. Justice Kelly
grappled with the same problem. In FederaZ Discount Corp. v. St.
Pierre,31 a finance company attempted to enforce a promissory note
in the same "floor-plan" circumstances as previously outlined. The
question arose as to whether the finance company could be said to
receive the note in "good faith" and in so doing be a holder in due
course. He states on page 97:
"There can be no doubt that everyday commercial life demands that
the integrity of bills of exchange be recognized and that those acquiring
them in good faith should not be required unnecessarily to make inquiries
to establish their authenticity."3
2
Further, he states the countervailing policy:
"It is not necessary for the support of ordinary commercial transactions
that the holder of a bill of exchange should under all circumstances
be permitted to shield himself behind the guise of a holder In due
course....
With the growth of the sale of household and personal goods on the
extended payment plan, the promissory note, the conditional sales
contract and the finance company have become inseparable parts of
the procedure whereby the merchant realizes immediately cash from
the extended obligation of the purchaser from him. The very existence
of the seller's business depends on his ability to convert into cash
these obligations and the finance company, standing ready and willing
to buy them, has become not only an essential part of retail selling on
the time payment plan, but is in effect a department of the seller's
business, exercising a measure of control over the seller's sales by the
requirements laid down with regard to the negotiable paper proposed
to be purchased.
In the course of this development an attempt has been made to
project into the field of household law the law merchant originally
designed for dealings between merchants. The fiction has been permitted
to flourish that the finance company is a foreign and independent
agency."33
A court faced with determining the applicability of the Sma/ Loans
Act to "floor-planned" instalment sales, likewise, would be confronted
with a similar dilemma.
28 (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 337.
29 Ibid., 353.
"We must by no means be understood as saying that mercantile usage,
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As well as making a choice between these two competing policies,
the Court will necessarily be forced to determine the extent of creative
power it may legitimately exercise without usurping the function
of the legislature. In the well known American decision, International
News Service v. Associated Press,3 4 the Supreme Court of the United
States faced the same problem in a different context. As to the
proper creative power of a court Mr. Justice Brandeis had this to say:
"The injustice of such action is obvious. But to give relief against it
would involve more than the application of existing rules of law to
new facts. It would require the making of a new rule in analogy to
existing ones. The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and
has often satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies or by
expanding a rule or principle. This process has been in the main wisely
applied and should not be discontinued. . . . But with the increasing
complexity of society, the public interest tends to become omnipresent;
and the problems presented by new demands cease to be simple.3 5
Mr. Justice Brandeis goes on to point out that the courts are not
equipped to make the investigation and enquiry necessary before a
major change in the law is made. He states:
"A Legislature . . . would consider such facts and possibilities and
others which appropriate inquiry might disclose."36
For the reasons suggested by Mr. Justice Brandeis, it is sub-
mitted that for a court to interpret the Small Loans Act so as to
include instalment sales would be entirely unsatisfactory. It has no
machinery to investigate the appropriateness of such a holding. Per-
haps the schedule of interest rates would not be flexible enough to
cover all aspects of consumer sales financing. Further, a straight
application of the terms of that legislation without administrative
machinery to assist in determining a standard calculation of simple
interest, would likely be cumbersome and dilatory in operation. If
retail instalment credit is to be regulated at all it would be done
most effectively by legislation based on thorough research.
IV REGULATION OF INSTALMENT CREDIT BY LEGISLATION
Currently in the United States, thirty-one States have motor
vehicle instalment sales regulation statutes and eighteen have legis-
lation covering all goods. Of these, twenty-three States regulate
finance charges and rebates, but only a few have interest rate dis-
closure requirements. In Canada,37 only Alberta, New Brunswick
and Quebec have regulatory legislation, and none of these require
disclosure of the simple interest rate per annum, although some have
"dollar disclosure" provisions.3 8 The proposed Finance Charges (Dis-
closure) Act would, if enacted, require disclosure of the dollar amount
34 (1918) 248 U.S. 215.
3 5 Ibid., 262.3 6 Ibid., 264.
37 The Time Sale Agreement Act, R.S.M. 1960, c. 76, is similar to Senator
Croll's Bill but has not yet been proclaimed.3 8 See generally Ziegel; Retail Instalment Sales Legislation: A Historical
and Compmarative Survey (1962) 14 U. of Toronto L.J. 143 at 154-155.
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of "finance charges" as well as a statement of the effective simple
interest rate.3 9
The legislation appears to be the result of W. C. Hood's com-
ments in his report, Financing Economic Activity in Canada.40 Mr.
Hood is of the opinion that few car buyers financing their purchases
considered the alternate methods and costs of credit. He states:
"But without being able to prove the point, there seems to be abundant
evidence that the bulk of credit supplied to consumers is made available
without the consumer having clear, full knowledge of the alternatives
available to them and the costs of each." 41
He goes on:
"We are however concerned with one aspect of this matter. This Is the
burden imposed on the economy by the consumers Ignorance of the
cost of money he borrows. We have contended in this chapter that
such ignorance is widespread. We have also contended one of the
reasons finance companies did not respond to the pressures of tight
money was because they could, to some degree at least, pass higher
interest costs on to the consumer in the form of higher charges. This
was done in very large measure by lengthening the terms of the loans
as charges were raised so that the increase in monthly payments could
be kept to modest proportions." 42
"It may be that even if consumers know and appreciate the rates of
interest they are paying they will even pay high rates. If so, the price
system must be said to allocate the funds and the real resources they
command to those willing and able to pay for them and this s the
essential function of the price system. But there are reasonable
grounds for doubt that there are no attainable limits to the rates of
interest consumers will pay for borrowed funds if they are full/ aware
of the charges imposed on them. And, if consumers are led, through
ignorance of the facts, to borrow more than they would otherwise do,
a misallocation of resources results, and under conditions of excessive
demand for resources, support is given to the forces of Inflation."43
Mr. Hood then mentions the difficulty of forecasting the effectiveness
of monetary pressure on future financing and states that direct
governmental control over finance companies borrowing and reserves
39 Section 3 contains the substance of the legislation:
"3. Every credit financier who enters into a transaction extending
credit to another person, as referred to in paragraph (a) of section 2,
shall in accordance with regulations made under section 5, and before
the transaction is complete, furnish such other person with a clear
statement in writing setting forth
(a) the total amount of the unpaid balance outstanding;
(b) the total amount of the finance charges to be borne by such other
person in connection with the transaction; and
(c) the percentage relationship, expressed in terms of simple annual
interest, that the total amount of the finance charges bears to the
unpaid balance outstanding under the transaction."
In this connection "finance charges" means the total cost of the credit to
the consumer thereof, and includes interest, fees, bonuses, service charges,
discounts and any other type of charge.
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is undesirable. However, in conclusion he does recommend dis-
closure, saying:
"But we are of the view that there is one form of legislation which
is as desirable in periods of inflation as in other periods, whose effects
would be wholly salutory both in assisting the price mechanism and in
the performance of its essential function and in controlling inflation,
which is apparently within the competence of the federal parliament.
This is legislation designed to ensure that those institutions such as
instalment finance companies, loan companies, money lenders, banks and
retail dealers, which extend credit to consumers, state the rate of
interest being charged clearly and in such form as will permit consumers
readily, without elaborate calculation, to compare the rates charged by
different lenders. The price system and monetary policy which works
through the price system, cannot work if prices are not known
generally."44
Mr. Hood recognizes the complexity of the instalment sales
financing transaction, with the practice of dealer participation, and
he realizes the difficulties legislators would have in drafting legisla-
tion to meet the requirements of business by means of imposing a
schedule of maximum rates. To construct a schedule of rates suffi-
ciently flexible to equitably cover all transactions would be almost
an impossibility. For example, there would need to be one rate for
new automobiles and others for used automobiles in various degrees
based on value. Rates would have to be established for luxury items
in various price ranges. White goods, such as stoves and refrigera-
tors, would need special consideration as well. Legislation which
attempted such regulation of retail instalment credit would probably
be too cumbersome to be effective. Perhaps it would also be an
unwarranted interference with private enterprise.
At present, most finance companies clearly disclose on the face
of their contracts the price of the article purchased, the amount of
the finance charge, the amount of each periodic instalment and the
total cost in dollar amounts.4 5 The framers of the Finance Charges
(Disclosure) Bill intend, that by making this legally necessary, plus
requiring a translation of the dollar amounts into an effective simple
interest rate, consumers will become more discerning and sensitive
to the cost of their credit. It follows, it is argued, that the price
system would then operate more effectively and that the desired
benefits of competitive behaviour in the consumer oriented market,
namely: an equitable diffusion of the resulting real income among
consumers; a more accurate reflection of supply and demand; and
more effective contra-cyclical programs of stabilization, primarily
utilizing methods of monetary and fiscal policy; would be more
readily achieved.46 The legislation by requiring disclosure of a simple
interest rate, aims to alleviate the believed widespread consumer
4 4Ibid., 197.
45The writer has examined the standard contract forms of several of
the leading finance companies.
4 6 Brecher, Combines and Competition: A Re-Ap praisal of Canadian Public
Policy, 38 Can. Bar Rev., 523, at 554-558 (1960).
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ignorance as to the cost of credit and in so doing, thereby remove that
blight from the working of the price system.
However, there would appear to be one serious fault with the
proposed legislation. Its underlying assumption is that disclosure
of the effective simple interest rate would result in consumers com-
paring credit costs and shopping for the most advantageous method
of deferring payment. However, the Finance Charges (Disclosure)
Bill limits itself to instalment sales as evidenced by the definition
of "credit financier" as follows:
"2(a) 'credit financier' means any person who in the ordinary course
of business, whether operated separately or in conjunction with some
other business, enters into a transaction with another person arising
out of a sale or agreement for sale of personal property, or the pro-
vision or agreement for the provision of services to such other person,
either for present or future delivery or performance, whereby thewhole part of the price or remuneration therefor is to become payable
to such person after the transaction is complete."47
To give the consumer freedom to make an intelligent choice the
legislation should apply to all modes of credit financing including
loans from banks, loan companies and credit unions. It is a well
known fact that the Bank Act limits banks to a maximum rate of
interest of 6%, but when discounted the effective annual simple
interest rate can vary from 9-12% depending on the method of
repayment. To allow the consumer a proper choice, the whole field
of consumer credit should be subject to the same disclosures re-
quirements.
Also, for breach of its provisions, the Bill provides that there
is to be "no remedy" for collection of finance charges. However, the
Bill would not seem to affect a holder in due course of a promissory
note. If this be so, the whole purpose and effect of the legislation
would be frustrated.
As well, there are practical difficulties in requiring disclosure
of finance charges in terms of the effective simple interest rate.
One of the difficulties is the calculation of true simple interest. The
several different formulae and different calculations make uniformity
almost impossible unless a standard schedule is compiled. Another
related difficulty is determining accuracy in pricing. It is trite to
state that the calculation of simple interest requires a cash price
and a finance charge; but a correct cash price is extremely illusive.
Credit costs in some cases could be buried and misleading advertising
could result. This is a fear of some financing institutions. One
such firm in its monthly bulletin stated:
"If in spite of these difficulties, Senator Croll's Bill became law, the
net effect would probably be to drive the cost of consumer credit 'under-
ground'. The inability to comply, or competitive pressure to quote the
lowest possible 'interest' rate, would force merchants to 'bury' all or
part of the finance charge in the price of goods sold. This could be
done today because it is difficult for the consumer to establish the
47 Suirra, footnote 1.
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actual cash price of most merchandise. Prices cannot be set by the
manufacturer; they vary from merchant to merchant; from brand to
brand and model to model. If the true cash price cannot be established,
neither can the relative credit price. If the credit differential-the
difference between the cash price and credit price-cannot be established,
it is impossible to calculate or compare equivalent rates of interest."
48
V THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Any legislation regulating instalment sales faces a constitutional
problem embodied in Sections 91 and 92 of the British North, America
Act. That is, does the legislation fall within the subject matter of
"interest" under head 91(19) or, is it a provincial matter properly
contained in 92(13) which grants jurisdiction over "civil rights and
property in the province" to the provincial legislature? The leading
authority is a decision of the Privy Council, Lethbridge Northern
Irrigation District vs. Independent Order of Foresters.4 9 The question
as to whether 91(19) was confined only to usury was answered
as follows:
"Their Lordships are of the opinion that so far from supporting the
argument for a restricted interpretation of head 19 of s. 91 in order
to confine it to usurious interest, the history of the usury laws in
Canada destroys it. Their Lordships do not find it necessary to attempt
to lay down any exhaustive definition of 'interest'. The word itself is
in common use and is well understood. It is sufficient to say that in
its ordinary connotation it covers contractual interest and contractual
interest is the subject of the Act now in question." 5 0
In a subsequent decision, the Privy Council approved the Independent
Order of Foresters51 decision stating:
"It is therefore clear that a provincial statute which varies the stipula-
tion in a contract as to the rate of interest to be exacted would not be
consonant with the existence and exercise of the exclusive Dominion
power to legislate in respect of interest. The Dominion power would
likewise be invaded if the provincial enactment was directed to post-
poning the contractual date for the payment of interest without altering
the rate, for this equally would be legislating in respect of interest."
5 2
In a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision, Re Sampson and Bar-
fried Enterprises Ltd., the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act
53
was held ultra vires the provincial legislature as being legislation in
relation to interest. Schroeder J.A. made these comments:
"The word 'interest' is not, then, a technical term and it is not restricted
in any sense to compensation determinable by the application of a
rate percentum to the principal amount of a loan."
5 4
On page 457 he states further:
"In the past it has been contended on behalf of the Provinces in support
of provincial legislation touching the subject of interest that the operation
of 91(19) is limited in its scope and application and applies only to




51 A.G. of Saskatchewan v. A.G. of Canada, [1949] A.C. 110.
52 Ibid., 124.
53 (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
54 Ibid., 454.
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interest which may be said to be usurious, or to the 'rate of' interest,
and that it does not extend to interest in the broader sense. It has
been made clear, however, in earlier authorities, that if the Fathers of
Confederation had so intended to limit Parliament's powers the words
'rate of' could have been inserted before the word 'interest' In Section
91(19)."55
Although the courts seem to give "interest" a wide meaning,
there can be no doubt that the proposed legislation does concern
contracts of sale. In Traders Finance Corporation v. Casselman5 r
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, later affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Canada, held a statute limiting recovery on an instalment sale
contract to the value of the vendor's lien, to be intra vires the pro-
vincial legislature under 91(15) of the British North America Act.
Nevertheless it would appear that in substance the proposed
federal legislation deals with interest. It may incidentally affect
property and civil rights within the province; indeed, the legislation
may be within the competence of the provincial legislature as well.
However, if the courts continue to apply a broad interpretation to
"interest" when considering legislation in the nature of the Finance
Charges (Disclosure) Bill,57 they would probably find it intra ires
the Parliament of Canada.
VI CONCLUSION
It has peen pointed out that there has been a huge increase in
consumer debt outstanding since the Second World War and that
much of this has been in the form of instalment sales, a relatively
novel commercial device involving the interaction of several legal
concepts. This development has not been paralleled by the law and
an anomalous situation has developed in which a consumer, by
borrowing money and purchasing by cash, is protected by the Small
Loans Act, whereas, if he finances an acquisition by means of an
instalment sale, there is no protection. In the consumer sales financing
industry, competition works to the disadvantage of the consumer.
Also, it appears that "dollar disclosure" is not sufficient to allow
comparison of credit costs. In these circumstances there has been
considerable agitation for regulation of retail instalment credit.
The Small Loans Act is not designed to apply to the consumer
instalment sale and to be so interpreted would be an unsatisfactory
solution. Secondly, legislation establishing a schedule of maximum
rates would not only be cumbersome and inefficient but also could
amount to an unwarranted interference with private enterprise.
The proposed legislation requiring disclosure of "dollar amounts"
and "simple interest rates" would seem to be the most appropriate
measure.
It is submitted, however, that a few minor amendments would
greatly increase its effectiveness. To properly allow complete con-
55 Id.
56 (1960), 25 W.W.P 289; 22 D.L.R. (2d) 177.
5 7 Supra, footnote 1.
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sumer choice, the legislation should be made applicable to all forms
of consumer credit. Administrative machinery similar to that pro-
vided by the Mortgage Brokers Registration Act,58 where the Super-
intendent of Insurance licenses mortgage brokers annually, would be
an effective means of implementing the legislation. Through the
instrumentality of such an office, a standard simple interest rate
could be maintained, alleged breaches could be investigated and the
threat of possible refusal to renew a licence would be a potent sanc-
tion. Also, the present remedy of barring recovery of finance charges
should be enlarged to expressly cover actions on the promissory note.
In the last analysis, however, the ultimate responsibility for
effective working of the proposed legislation, should it come into
force, will rest with consumers themselves. If disclosure of the
simple interest rate does not remedy the alleged lack of knowledge
and understanding, the fault will not be with the law. Legislation
cannot dispel apathy.
5S R.S.O. 1960 c. 244 Am. 1960-61 c. 57 Am. 1961-62, c. 82.
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